Jurisdiction Over State Banks: Does the Bank Holding Company Act Preempt State Regulation? by Smathers, Steven E.
JURISDICTION OVER STATE BANKS: DOES
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT PRE-
EMPT STATE REGULATION?
The banks in the United States can be divided into two groups:
national banks and state banks. National banks have national chart-
ers and belong to the Federal Reserve System.' They are insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [hereinafter F.D.I.C.],2
and are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency.3 State-
chartered banks may belong to the Federal Reserve System and may
be insured by the F.D.I.C.,4 but their basic regulation is by local
authorities.5 All state-chartered banks which are members of the Fed-
eral Reserve and the F.D.I.C. have to comply with the specific regula-
tions of those particular agencies. However, this federal regulation
applies only to specific areas leaving the general regulation of state
banks to a state banking agency.
The establishment of branch banks is administered by the state
superintendent of banks6 or by the Comptroller of the Currency7
depending on the bank's charter. The state superintendent of banks,
before approving a branch application, must ascertain whether all of
the state's statutory requirements for branching have been met. For
example, in Ohio, banks can only open branches in the county where
their principal place of business is located, and then only when the
Ohio Superintendent of Banks has ascertained that the proposed
institution will serve the needs and convenience of the public and has
a reasonable probability of economic success.'
I All national banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System. See Ch.
6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified, as amended, in § 409 of 31 U.S.C. and in various sections of
Title 12 U.S.C.) for the Federal Reserve Act itself. See also Hackley, Our Baffling Banking
System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 566 (1966).
2 Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides that all members of the Federal Reserve System
are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See Ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950)
(codified, as amended in §§ 1728(b) and 1811-31 of Title 12 U.S.C., and in sections of Title 18
U.S.C. See also 52 VA. L. REv., supra note 1, at 566.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1970).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970). See also 52 VA. L. REv., supra note 1, at 566.
E.g., OHIo REv. CODE §§ 1125.01-99 (1968).
E.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 1111.02 (1968).
7 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
8 OHIO REV. CODE § 1111.03 (1968) states:
(A) No branch shall be established until the consent of the superintendent of
banks has been obtained, and no bank shall establish a branch in any place other
than that designated in its articles of incorporation as its principal place of business,
except in a municipal corporation contiguous to such designated place, or in other
parts of the county in which the municipal corporation in which the principal place
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The Comptroller of the Currency, empowered by federal law to
approve national branch bank formation, is bound by the same
branching restrictions which apply to his state counterpart plus all
federal restrictions.' The incorporation of the state's branching re-
quirements into the federal law was intended by Congress to maintain
competitive equality between the two systems of banks.10
In the last few decades expansion by branching has slowed and
bank growth, state and national, has been through the bank holding
company." This phenomenon is a direct result of the failure of courts
and legislatures to extend the restrictions on branch banking to sub-
sidiary banks owned and operated by holding companies.' 2 Thus, if a
bank wishes to expand in areas prohibited by state law it may be able
to do so by creating a bank holding company and having the holding
company acquire an existing bank in the prohibited area or petition
for a new charter in that area.
The Bank Holding Company Act 13 was designed by Congress
to regulate holding company expansion. Pursuant to § 1842(a) of the
Act, 4 the formation of new holding companies and the expansion of
of business of the bank is located, provided, any bank may maintain and operate as
a branch, any branch authorized prior to January 1, 1968.
(B) A bank may establish and maintain a branch outside the United States
with the prior written approval of the superintendent and subject to an agreement
satisfactory to the division providing for the times, method, and reimbursement of
expenses of examination of such branch.
(C) In considering an application for a branch under division (A) of this
section, the superintendent shall ascertain whether
(1) The convenience and needs of the public will be served by the proposed
branch;
(2) The population and economic characteristics of the area primarily to be
served afford reasonable promise of adequate support for the proposed branch;
(3) The proposed branch meets such other reasonable criteria as he may re-
quire.
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
', First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966). This case
summarizes the legislative history which reveals the intent of Congress to preserve competitive
equality.
1t Note, Federal-State Relations under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 66 YALE
L. J. 1093, 1096 (1957), and Comment, Transamerica-The Bank Holding Problem, 1 STAN.
L. REv. 658 (1949).
22 See, Hearings on H.R. 6227 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at 47-48 (1955).
13 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
1" 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1970) states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval of the Board, (1) for
any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank holding company;
(2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a bank
holding company; (3) for any bank holding company to acquire direct or indirect
ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such
company will directly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the
voting share of such bank; (4) for any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof,
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existing companies is forbidden without the prior approval of the
Federal Reserve Board. Congress, while allocating this jurisdiction to
the Board, tried to maintain the federal-state balance of bank regula-
tion through three sections of the Act.
The first, § 1842(d),15 forbids a bank holding company from
expanding across state lines under any circumstances unless the state
to be entered has legislated specifically to allow foreign corporations
to acquire domestic banks. The second, § 1846,16 not only reserves to
the states all powers and jurisdiction over bank holding companies
which they had prior to the passage of the Act, but also permits them
to expand their regulation over bank holding companies. The third,
§ 1842(6),17 insures that the Board is informed by the relevant banking
authority, state or federal, of that authority's position on the legality
of the proposed holding company. This recommendation does not
bind the Board. Thus the independence of the Board is preserved and
both the Comptroller and the state authorities are prevented from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the Board.
However, the question remains whether, after a Board decision
contrary to the recommendation of the Comptroller or state superin-
tendent, these officials must conform to the Board's decision in what
would otherwise be a discretionary function. For example, a new
national banking institution can not commence operations until the
Comptroller certifies that institution.18 If that institution has been
other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5)
for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate with any other bank holding
company.
15 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application shall
be approved under this section which will permit any bank holding company or any
subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest in,
or all or substantially all of the assets of any additional bank located outside the
State in which the operations of such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries
were principally conducted on July 1, 1966, or the date on which such company
became a bank holding company, whichever is later, unless the acquisition of such
shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding company is specifi-
cally authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by
language to that effect and not merely by implication. For the purposes of this
section, the State in which the operations of a bank holding company's subsidiaries
are principally conducted is that State in which total deposits of all such banking
subsidiaries are largest.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1970) provides:
The enactment by the Congress of this chapter shall not be construed as prevent-
ing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may
hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries
thereof.
17 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970).
Is 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1970).
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approved by the Board can the Comptroller deny certification? If the
Comptroller is bound by the decision of the Board are the state
banking authorities" also bound when they are requested to grant
charters or branch applications to banks in a holding company reorg-
anization which has been approved by the Board?
This note will examine whether Congress intended to pre-empt
the states by vesting the Board with exclusive jurisdiction over bank
holding companies through an investigation of (1) the relevant state
and federal case law, and (2) the legislative history of the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act.
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. Federal
The Comptroller of the Currency was clearly denied the power
to reverse a decision of the Board in Whitney National Bank in
Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans.2" Pursuant to § 26 of the
National Bank Act2' the Comptroller is to determine if a banking
association is entitled to commence business, but the Supreme Court
ruled that this authority was subordinated to the Board's authority
through Congress' allocation of jurisdiction in the Bank Holding
Company Act.
In Whitney a national bank in New Orleans decided to try to
establish a branch in an adjoining parish. The Louisiana bank law
prohibited banks from establishing branches in adjoining parishes.22
The Whitney National Bank, after consulting with the Comptroller
of the Currency, attempted to circumvent the state law by first form-
ing a bank holding company and then establishing a subsidiary bank
in the neighboring parish. The reorganization of Whitney into a bank
holding company and the establishment of the subsidiary was ap-
proved by the Board over the objection of several competing banks.
After the Board approved the Whitney reorganization the Louis-
iana legislature passed a bill prohibiting the operation of bank hold-
ing companies within its borders.2 An appeal filed by the objecting
banks in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
pending when the Louisiana legislature passed the prohibitory legisla-
tion. At this juncture the objecting banks filed an action and obtained
a permanent injunction in the District Court for the District of
,1 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1103.07, 1111.03 (1968).
- 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
21 12 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
22 LA. REV. STAT. § 6:54 (1950).
3 LA. REV. STAT. §§ 6:1001-6:1006 (Supp. 1974).
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Columbia which barred the Comptroller from permitting the subsidi-
ary to open.24 The court of appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the
district court which issued the injunction,21 but the Supreme Court
reversed deciding that the District Court for the District of Columbia
had no jurisdiction to pass on the holding company proposal, 26 and
that original and exclusive jurisdiction over bank holding companies
rested with the Board. This decision limited the potential discretion
of the Comptroller since if the jurisdiction of the Board was exclusive
then the Comptroller's duties in certifying new institutions became
ministerial whenever a bank holding company was involved.
This allocation of exclusive jurisdiction is based on two grounds.
First, the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act re-
veals that Congress expressly rejected a provision designed to give the
Comptroller a veto over a decision of the BoardY The Court noted:
[The] legislative history clearly indicates that Congress had no in-
tention to give the Comptroller a veto over the Board in such cases.
It follows that it is the exclusive function of the Board to act in such
cases and contests must be pursued before it, not before the Comp-
troller.28
The Supreme Court also observed that Congress had rejected a
provision for de novo review of the Board's decisions in the district
courts. 2 The Court concluded from this rejection of de novo review
that challenges to the Board's decisions should be pursued only along
the lines prescribed in the Bank Holding Company Act.3"
The second basis for the Whitney decision is grounded in several
Supreme Court cases which have stated that where Congress has
designed a statutory review mechanism to bring agency expertise to
bear on a specific problem that mechanism is deemed to be exclu-
sive.31 The Court reasons that since the mechanism outlined in the
Bank Holding Company Act is designed to bring the Board's special-
ized expertise to bear on holding company proposals, that mechanism
should be the exclusive authority. The Court in Whitney noted:
'* Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 211 F. Supp. 576 (D.D.C. 1962).
Whitney Nat'l Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 323 F.2d
290 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
25 379 U.S. at 414-15.
101 CONG. REC. 8186-87.
379 U.S. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
0 The correct appeal procedure is located in 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970).
11 See, Callaman Road Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 (1953); Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 (1938); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
[Vol. 36
NOTES
To permit a district court to make the initial determination of a
plan's propriety would substantially decrease the effectiveness of the
statutory design.32
In sum, the fact that federal law confers certain duties on the
Comptroller does not, according to Whitney, give the Comptroller
the ability to frustrate a Board decision. 33 The legislative history of
the Act rejecting the Comptroller's veto and the decision by the
Congress to provide a mechanism to bring a specific agency's exper-
tise to bear on a question indicates convincingly to the Court that the
Board has exclusive original jurisdiction over bank holding company
acquisitions where national banks are involved.
The court of appeals decision in Whitney, which was reversed on
the procedural grounds mentioned above, indicated that the test for
applying state branch law to the holding company acquisition was
whether the operation of the holding company and the acquired sub-
sidiary were "unitary" in structure. 34 In other words, if the subsidi-
ary acted as a "de facto" branch it was to be governed by the state
branching laws. These laws would be enforced by the Federal Re-
serve's action in evaluating holding company expansion plans.
The Board rejected this premise prior to 1973,'3 instead insisting
that the legality of holding company acquisitions was governed by the
tests set out in the Bank Holding Company Act,35 which made local
branching laws irrelevant. In 1973 the Board abandoned this position
in their appeal in Gravois Bank v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.37 In Gravois the Board conceded that it was obliged
to determine if the acquisition of a bank by a holding company would
result in the creation of a branch bank. If it did amount to the
establishment of a branch, the Board would be obliged to apply the
state law applicable to national banks under § 36 of the National
Bank Act and thus determine if the establishment of the "de facto"
branch was in accordance with the state law.
In American Bank of Tulsa v. Smith38 the Tenth Circuit reaf-
firmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board over bank holding com-
pany acquisitions by requiring the Board to determine if a proposed
22 379 U.S. at 420.
Id. at 419.
323 F.2d at 303. See also, First Nat'l Bank of Billings v. First Bank Stock Corp., 306
F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1962).
35 See First Arkansas Bankstock Corp., 56 FED. RESERVE BULL. 778 (1970); Denver U.S.
Bancorporation, Inc., 49 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1518 (1963); First Colorado Bancshares, Inc.,
49 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1646 (1963).
3 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970).
37 478 F.2d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 1973).
3S 503 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1974).
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bank was a subsidiary of a holding company, and if a subsidiary,
whether it was also a de facto branch. Only after the Board decided
that the bank Was not a subsidiary of the holding company would the
Comptroller be entitled to issue the requested charter. 9 The court
was careful to note that it did not have jurisdiction over the merits
of the controversy, but that it did have jurisdiction to stay the hand
of the Comptroller until the Board decided the subsidiary and branch
status of the proposed bank.4"
The conclusion which follows from the Whitney, Gravois, and
American cases is that not only does the Board have exclusive juris-
diction over holding company acquisitions involving national banks,
thus elminating any discretionary authority of the Comptroller, but
the Board has jurisidiction to decide which acquisitions and reorgani-
zations fall within the area Congress sought to regulate through the
Bank Holding Company Act.
B. State Cases
The Whitney rationale was applied to state regulation in Neally
v. Brown.4" The Maine supreme court in Neally concluded that ques-
tions of organization and operation of a bank holding company lie
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Board" despite a
Maine bank statute43 requiring the State Commission of Banks to
approve the creation of new state banks.
In Neally, Depositors Corporation, a bank holding company
registered with the Federal Reserve Board, made application to es-
tablish two new trust companies. The Bank Commissioner for the
State of Maine denied each application on the ground that "issuance
of said certificates would be a contravention of the banking laws of
the State of Maine." 4 The superior court reversed the decision of the
Bank Commissioner on the ground that the applications did not con-
travene the branch banking law of Maine as the Commissioner con-
tended. The Supreme Court of Maine affirmed the superior court's
decision holding that the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction over bank
holding company arrangements:
Congress reposed original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal
Reserve Board, subject to review only by an appropriate United
I' ld. at 789.
40 Id. at 788.
" 284 A.2d 480 (Me. 1971).
42 Id. at 482.
1 9 MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. § 993 (1964).
" 284 A.2d at 481.
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States Court of Appeals . . . to assess and decide the propriety,
-including the applicability and effect not only of federal but also
of state law,-of any arrangement in which a bank holding com-
pany has a critical position of control in the organization and opera-
tion of a new trust company.45
The Neally decision relies on three separate premises: first, Con-
gress in allocating jurisdiction over bank holding companies did not
differentiate between national and state banks, and therefore, the
Board should have equivalent jurisdiction over both types of banks."
Second, the Neally court found support for its decision in the legisla-
tive history of the Bank Holding Company Act. The Neally court felt
that since a veto power originally given to state banking authorities
over board decisions was deleted, Congress intended the Board's deci-
sion to be final.
The Maine court also relied on those sections of the Whitney
opinion which justify the Board's jurisdiction on the basis of agency
expertise. 7 That is, since Congress designed this statutory scheme to
allow an agency with expertise to evaluate the bank holding company
questions, this scheme must have been intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction. The Neally court felt that this rationale applies with the
same force to both state and national banks.
Although there is a dearth of explicit case law on this point, an
examination of two other state cases highlights the problem. In
Central Bank of Clayton v. State Banking Board of Missouri48 the
state banking board assumed that it had jurisdiction to determine in
a bank chartering procedure whether the new bank's acquisition by
a holding company violated the state's branching laws. The Missouri
court of appeals felt that it was clear from Neally and Whitney that
the Federal Reserve had exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial
determination. However, the Missouri court, unlike the Neally court,
failed to decide whether the state agency had jurisdiction to rule on
the application of state law to the plan where the Board had already
granted an application.49 If the state has jurisdiction to rule on the
application of state law, the Comptroller's jurisdiction is only exclu-
sive as to federal authorities.
In an Ohio case, In re Cleveland Trust Company of Lake
County,50 the Ohio supreme court decided that a plan of
Id. at 483.
I d. at 485-88.
a Id. at 487.
48 509 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
41 Id. at 193.
'o 38 Ohio St. 2d 183, 311 N.E.2d 854 (1974).
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reorganization by a bank holding company which created three new
charter state banks was not branching in violation of the state's geo-
graphical restrictions of branch formation. In reaching this decision
the court did not discuss the jurisdictional issue except to reject
Neally and acknowledge the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts
over state law questions."
II. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY52
The application of the Bank Holding Company Act to national
banks seems clear from the Whitney and Gravois cases. Any ques-
tions involving a national bank holding company acquisition fall
within the exclusive domain of the Federal Reserve Board. Even the
question of de facto branching through a holding company is a ques-
tion for the Board. The Board must determine whether the subsidiary
is what the federal law would characterize as a branch and then
whether the state branching law permits its formation. Normally this
would be a question for the Comptroller, but the Whitney decision
leaves little doubt that when in reference to a bank holding company
such a question falls within the province of the Board.
Jurisdiction over state banks involved in a holding company
arrangement is a more complicated matter. No one disputes that the
Federal Reserve Board has initial jurisdiction over bank holding com-
pany acquisitions even when state banks are involved. However, there
is a split of authority on whether a state banking agency has the
power to possibly undermine a Board decision by disapproving, on
state law grounds, a plan which the Board has previously approved.
The intent of Congress must be ascertained in answering this
question since Congress had the authority to pre-empt the state's
jurisdiction if it so desires.0 In Neally the Maine court decided that
11 Id. at 194 n.4 states:
The approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board is required
in such holding company reorganizations as this. . . . We share the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Gary v. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. (1973), Civ.
No. 77,386, and the Court of Common Pleas below, that it is for the courts of the
state to define such questions of state law as may be involved in the actions of bank
holding companies. In doing so, we reject the suggestion of the Supreme Court of
Maine in Neally v. Brown (1971), 284 A.2d 480, that the federal authorities to which
responsibility for all other aspects of the review and approval of proposed holding
company reorganizations pass on issues of state law as well.
52 The analysis of the legislative history of the Act relies on the Ohio Attorney General's
brief written for the Court of Common Pleas decision in the Cleveland Trust case.
3 Most commentators agree that Congress has the power to regulate banking to the
exclusion of the states. The basis for this authority could arise from any one of three Constitu-
tional powers: power to regulate interstate commerce, U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Power to
lay and collect taxes, ld. c. 1; or power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, id. cl. 5.
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Congress did intend to pre-empt the state's jurisdiction in the area
of bank holding companies. 4 But from a careful analysis of the legis-
lative history of the Bank Holding Company Act it appears that
Congress did not intend to pre-empt55 the jurisdiction of the state
authorities.
The original version of the Bank Holding Company Act re-
flected a strong anti-holding company prejudice. One section of the
original act gave the appropriate state banking authority an absolute
veto power over any holding company acquisitions. 6 Another section
incorporated all the territorial restrictions of the state branch bank
laws into the federal law.17 This original House bill actually gave the
states power over national banks. The indiscriminate use of the blan-
ket veto would affect national banks as well as state banks. More-
over, the per se application of state branching restrictions would be
inappropriate in many situations, as when a holding company was not
acquiring all the stock of a potential subsidiary.
Congress replaced these two sections of the original bill with §
See, Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 749
(1966); Comment, Branch Banking Limitation Held Applicable to Approved Bank Holding
Company Operation, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 686 (1964); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1093 (1957). sunra
note 11.
" 284 A.2d at 485.
M Pre-emption is a difficult and involved subject with ramifications in all areas of federal-
state conflicts. The Supreme Court has recently stated that federal legislation only pre-empts
state legislation when (1) there is a need for national uniformity, (2) there is an actual conflict
between the two schemes of regulation, or (3) there is evidence of a congressional intent to pre-
empt the field. Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 at 430 (1963).
In the area of bank holding companies the federal courts have never expressed the view
that there was a need for national uniformity in bank regulation, in fact inherent in the dual
banking system is an allowance for each state to choose the degree of regulation it desires. Also
there is no conflict between the two schemes; therefore, if the federal law is to pre-empt the
state law this pre-emption must be based on congressional intent. See also, Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n
v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
Cf. Slain, Risk Distribution and Treble Damages: Insurance and Contribution, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 263 at 299 (1970), in which the author analyzes the need for national uniformity in
economic regulation of non-banking industries.
11 Section 5(b) of H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) states:
Before approving any application under this section, the Board shall give notice to
.. . the appropriate supervisory authority of the State in which Applicant company
or any bank the voting shares or assets of which are sought to be acquired is a state
bank. If the authority so notified by the Board files its written disapproval of the
application within 30 days the application shall not be granted.
" Section 5(c) of H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955) states:
Nothwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application shall be ap-
proved under this section which will permit. . . (2) any bank holding company or
any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest
in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any additional bank, except (i) within
geographical limitations that would apply to the establishment of branches of banks
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7,51 which emerged along with § 3(d) as the supposed protectors of
the states' authority. 0 Section 7 was designed to preserve the inde-
pendence of both state and federal banking systems by allowing the
states to maintain the control they previously had over state banks,
but preventing them from encroaching on federal authority. This
purpose is clearly expressed in a portion of Senate Report No. 1095,
which states:
In order to clarify the legislative history of Section 7, the com-
mittee wishes to emphasize that this section does not grant any new
authority to States over National Banks. The purpose of the section
is to preserve to the States those powers which they now have in our
dual banking system. It is always of uppermost importance in legis-
lation of this nature to preserve the dual system of National and
State Banks, and Section 7 must be viewed in that light."'
Thus, it is apparent from the Senate Report that the reason for
the deletion of the original section was not to deny the states any
power they already had over state banks or any power they might
gain through future legislation, but to prevent the states from exercis-
ing any influence over national banks. It is interesting to note that
the quoted legislative history indicates that the Board should care-
fully consider the views of state authorities on national bank expan-
sion. This idea is consistent with § 36 of the National Bank Act which
incorporates the state geographic restrictions on branch expansion
into federal law.13
The final version of the Act also rejected the automatic tie-in
with the state geographical restrictions, although Congress, as indi-
cated above, felt the restrictions should be carefully considered. Sen-
ate Report No. 1095 describes precisely why the direct tie-in was
rejected. It states:
The committee decided against inclusion of a provision in the
bill that would automatically apply State laws concerning branch
banking to bank holding company operations. The purposes of
branch banking laws are not identical with the purpose of this bill
to control bank holding companies. Moreover, branch banking is
mostly conducted by the use of depositors' funds, thus making the
under the law of such State, or (ii) unless such acquisition is at the time authorized
by the statute law of such State by language specifically granting such authority
affirmatively, and not merely by implication.
31 See 12 U.S.C. § 1846, note 16 supra.
10 66 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1097.
"' SENATE REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1956).
62 Id.
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
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protection of these funds of prime importance. Bank holding com-
panies, however, as such have no depositors. For operating funds
they have recourse to equity capital supplied by their shareholders.
It is believed the bill contains adequate provisions to regulate bank
holding company operations without an arbitrary tie-in with branch
banking laws."
It appears that the deletion of the provision authorizing the automatic
tie-in was clearly not intended to extend federal authority, rather it
grew from an appreciation of the complexities of bank holding com-
pany arrangements and their need for individual attention.
The states before passage of the Bank Holding Company Act
had the authority to enforce their own laws on bank and holding
company growth and pursuant to § 7, they should retain that author-
ity after the passage of the Act. The Senate Report, in affirming this
reservation of state authority, states:
.. . [A]nother provision of this bill [§ 7] expressly preserves to the
States a right to be more restrictive regarding the formation or
operation of bank holding companies within their respective borders
than the Federal authorities can be or are under this bill. Under such
a grant of authority, each State may, within the limits of its proper
jurisdiction of authority, be more severe on bank holding companies
as a class than (1) this bill empowers the Federal authorities to be
or (2) such Federal authorities actually are in their administration
of the provisions of this bill. In the opinion of the committee, this
provision adequately safeguards States' rights as to bank holding
companies."
The effect of the deletion of the two sections from the original
bill does not indicate an intent on the part of Congress to expand the
jurisdiction of the Board, as the Neally court hypothesized, but rather
an intent to preserve the authority of state officials while maintaining
the dual banking system. In addition to the protection given the states
through § 7, the so-called Douglas amendment, § 3(d), 8 also protects
the states by forbidding the acquisition of domestic banks by foreign
holding companies without specific state legislation authorizing this
expansion. This section applies equally to state and national banks
and indicates that Congress intended to allow the states to retain their
jurisdiction over the structure of the banking industry within their
state.
At this point in time it is beyond cavil that the individual states
" SENATE REP. No. 1095, supra note 61, at 11.
" SENATE REP. No. 1095, supra note 61, at 11.
- 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970).
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have the authority to pass specific legislation which restricts domestic
holding companies. 7 This legislation affects both national and state
holding companies within the state where it is enacted. The state
courts in litigation on this legislation have decided that Congress,
when it passed the Bank Holding Company Act, did not manifest an
intent to pre-empt the states.6 However, the approval of this method
of regulating holding companies does not exclude the possibility that
regulation can be accomplished through enforcement of the state's
existing banking laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal case law indicates that the Comptroller has no juris-
diction over bank holding company expansion since this jurisdiction
has been specifically allocated to the Federal Reserve Board. The
Board is an agency with acknowledged expertise in the area and to
allow intervention by the Comptroller would upset the statutory de-
sign of Congress.
The application of this analysis to state banking administrators
breaks down in two specific areas. First, the legislative history of the
Act demonstrates that Congress did intend to pre-empt the Comp-
troller but that it specifically did not intend to pre-empt state regula-
tion." Second, accepting the fact that a Congressional plan designed
to bring agency expertise on an issue allocates exclusive jurisdiction,
the plan in the case of state banks must be patterned within the
framework of the dual banking system. Thus even if the Board's
jurisdiction is exclusive among Federal authorities the dual system
forces it to be concurrent with state authorities.
The vitality of the dual system rests on two concepts: (1) compet-
itive equality between the two systems, 0 and (2) the maintenance of
local regulation of domestic institutions .7 This equality is only main-
tained as long as all banks expand within the same set of guidelines.
Congress insured this would be the case by making the state law
applicable to the national banks through the McFadden Act. 2 The
federal courts have explicitly recognized that some subsidiary opera-
tions by bank holding companies amount to branch banking. In these
1 Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith, 15 Ill. 2d 55, 153 N.E.2d 806 (1958), appeal
dismissed for lack of substantial federal question, 359 U.S. 311 (1959); semble Opinion of the
Justices, 102 N.H. 106, 151 A.2d 236 (1959).
0 15 III. 2d at 59, 153 N.E.2d at 810.
", See note 61, supra.
70 See note 10, supra.
71 66 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1097.
- 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
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situations the Board, fuhctioning as a federal instrumentality, must
interpret and apply those laws, both state and federal, which it be-
lieves are relevant. However, denying the states the right to enforce
their own laws subverts the goal of local regulation. To insure the
preservation of local regulation and the dual system in general, one
is forced to conclude that the state banking officials must have the
authority to at least enforce state laws as to state institutions. Just
as an incursion by the states on national banks was sought to be
avoided by Congress in deleting a section from the original Bank
Holding Company Act,73 so should the national authorities be lim-
ited in their exclusion of state authorities from the regulation of state
banks. This conclusion assumes greater weight when one recognizes
that specific holding company legislation passed by the states is en-
forceable. Therefore, not to allow the states to enforce other banking
laws amounts to drawing an arbitrary distinction between two equally
enforceable state laws.
American establishes that the Board has jurisdiction to deter-
mine if a holding company subsidiary is involved in an acquisition
regardless of the bank's charter and to then apply the Bank Holding
Company Act and whatever other laws are applicable in that situa-
tion.7" Similarly, after the Board has made a determination involving
state banks, the state banking authorities should have jurisdiction to
determine if their laws were violated. The dual banking system and
§ 7 of the Bank Holding Company Act require this.
It is concluded that the individual states must retain their juris-
diction over domestic banking institutions to preserve the dual bank-
ing system.7 5 A removal of the state's jurisdiction precludes it from
effectuating a banking structure which meets the needs and the goals
that the state has defined for itself.
Steven E. Smathers
1 See note 56 supra.
7 503 F.2d at 788.
n For a full discussion of dual binking and its underlying philosophical supports. See
Redford, Dual Banking, A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 749 (1966).
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